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I. INTRODUCTION
Delaware has long been at the “cutting-edge” in resolving commercial
1
disputes and providing contemporary statutory corporate governance principles.
The Corporate Council, an arm of the Delaware State Bar Association, meets
annually to update the Delaware corporation law as needed, in order to provide its
chartered corporations with significant advantages over corporations chartered
2
elsewhere. Accordingly, 51% of the publicly traded companies in the United
3
States, and 61% of the Fortune 500 companies are chartered in Delaware.
In April 2009, in order to preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering costeffective dispute resolution, the Corporate Council set forth an initiative, which the
Delaware State Legislature adopted into statute, that amended the rules governing
the Court of Chancery to permit the court to arbitrate disputes upon consent of the

* Pepperdine University School of Law J.D. Candidate 2014
1
H.R. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009); Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice, Del.
Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium:
Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It
Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 376.
2
Steele, supra note 1.
3
Id.
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4

parties. The genesis of the initiative was the presumption that the arbitration
program was one that was “needed and desired by the business community” as an
5
alternative to otherwise expensive litigation. The arbitration program, in addition,
was believed to provide a suitable forum for international disputants because it
would guarantee participants that disputes would be arbitrated by widely
recognized and competent business court judges, who are familiar with the laws
that govern business agreements and, additionally, it would provide an award
6
enforceable in other nations.
The arbitration program has not, however, been without critics. The
7
cornerstone of the arbitration program, as with all arbitration, is confidentiality.
Because the arbitration program is confidential, critics have argued that it creates a
“secret court” and violates the First Amendment right of access to court
8
proceedings.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
9
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”
The Fourteenth
Amendment extends these prohibitions to the states and bars government
10
interference with either the speaker or the listener.
A. Litigation
In 1980, through the splintered opinions comprising Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment entitles the
11
public and press the right to attend criminal trials. In Richmond Newspapers, the
Supreme Court reviewed a Virginia trial court’s decision to exclude the public and
12
press from a murder trial. In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger traced
the historic practice of open criminal trials from the earliest recorded proceedings
13
in Anglo-American history, and concluded that such practice was “unbroken”,
14
and “uncontradicted.”
Further, the Chief Justice described several public
benefits that were derived from the practice of openness, including honesty from
15
witnesses and reasoned decision making from jurists. Because the Court found
4

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a) (2009).
Steele, supra note 1, at 376-377.
6
Id.
7
ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 93–94 (2001)
(“Confidentiality is generally considered a bedrock principle for most ADR procedures. Thus,
participants in court-based ADR are usually assured at the outset of the process that their
communications will be kept confidential.”), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/ADRGuide.pdf/$file/ADRGuide.pdf.
8
Steele, supra note 1, at 378, 382.
9
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
12
Id. at 555.
13
Id. at 556.
14
Id. at 573.
15
Id. at 556.
5
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that criminal trials were historically open to the public and that such openness
promoted public benefits, it found that the First Amendment protects the public’s
16
right of access to such historically open proceedings.
Through Circuit Court opinions, the holding of Richmond Newspapers has
been extended to grant the public the right of access to civil litigation, granted that
17
In Publicker Industries, Inc. v.
there is no important countervailing interest.
Cohen, the Third Circuit explained that, similar to criminal trials, civil trials have
historically been presumed to be open to the public in the Anglo-American legal
18
system. The Third Circuit subsequently opined that many of the same rationales
19
supporting the openness of criminal trials applied equally to civil trials.
B. Experience and Logic Test
The Third Circuit has adopted the experience and logic test to determine if
there is a public right of access to a particular proceeding or record, if there is no
20
prior precedent.
Under this test, when a court assesses a claimed First
Amendment right of access, it must consider “[1] whether the place and process
have historically been open to the press and general public . . . [and] [2] whether
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular
21
process in question.” The two prongs, known as the “experience test” and the
“logic test” respectively, must both be satisfied to sustain a constitutional challenge
22
under the First Amendment.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Facts
On October 25, 2011, the Delaware Coalition for Open Government
(“DelCOG”) filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, alleging that the Delaware arbitration proceeding violated the First
23
Amendment right of access.
The Delaware arbitration procedure is ultimately adjudicatory, however,
settlement alternatives and non-adversarial options for resolution are embedded in
24
the program and are encouraged at “nearly every stage.” In order to utilize the
16

Id. at 580.
Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984).
18
Id. at 1068–69.
19
N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002).
20
Id. at 208–09.
21
Press-Enter. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
22
See id. at 201–02.
23
Complaint at 1, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No. 11–
01015), 2011 WL 5042086.
24
Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012); see DEL. CH. CT. R.
96(d)(3) (requiring that during the telephonic preliminary conference, and at the telephonic preliminary
hearing, the parties must discuss “whether mediation or other non-adjudicative methods of dispute
resolution might be appropriate.”); DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(d) (The parties “may agree at any stage of the
arbitration process to submit the dispute to the Court for mediation.”); DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(e) (“The
parties may agree, at any stage of the arbitration process, to seek the assistance of the Arbitrator in
17
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arbitration, a party must meet several requirements. First, the parties must consent
25
to participate in arbitration at the time the dispute is submitted to the court.
Second, at least one party to the dispute must be a business entity and one party
must be a citizen of the state of Delaware, although the same party can satisfy both
26
requirements. Third, if a plaintiff solely pursues monetary damages, the amount
27
in controversy must exceed one million dollars. Because the Court of Chancery
has traditionally limited equitable jurisdiction, Chancery arbitration allows some
parties to access Chancery Court Judges when they would otherwise be unable to
28
do so.
The Court of Chancery adopted Rules 96, 97, and 98 on January 5, 2010 in
29
order to administer the arbitration proceedings. In accordance with these rules,
parties seeking to arbitrate their dispute must file a petition with the Register in
30
Chancery.
Subsequently, the Chancellor appoints a Chancery Court judge to
31
preside over the case as an arbitrator.
The arbitrator holds a preliminary
32
conference within ten days of the petition’s filing, a preliminary hearing as soon
33
as practicable, and a hearing approximately ninety days after the petition’s
34
filing.
Both parties, including at least one representative on each side with the
35
authority to resolve the matter, are required to participate in the arbitration. Prior
to the hearing, the parties and arbitrator together can agree to modify and adopt
36
additional rules for the arbitration. If no agreement is reached, Chancery Court
37
Rules 2637 apply by default.
While the arbitrator does have the power to issue interim, interlocutory, or
partial rulings, orders, and awards, they are not enforced by the power of the state

reaching settlement with regard to the issues identified in the petition prior to a final decision from the
Arbitrator.”).
25
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 347 (2009). There is no requirement that the parties have an
agreement to arbitrate their disputes prior to the dispute arising. Id.
26
Id. § 347(a)(2)–(3). Neither party, however, may be a consumer. Id. § 347(a)(4). A consumer is
defined as an individual who purchases or leases merchandise for personal use. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6 §
2731(1).
27
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 347(a)(5). If a plaintiff pursues an equitable remedy, even if in
conjunction with monetary damages, there is no amount in controversy criteria. Id.
28
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Kevin F. Brady & Francis G.X.
Pileggi, Recent Key Delaware Corporate and Commercial Decisions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 421, 456
(2010)).
29
DEL. CH. CT. RS. 96–98.
30
Id. 97(a). The petition certifies that the jurisdictional requirements are met and states the nature
of the dispute, the claims contended, and the remedies sought. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp.
2d at 495.
31
DEL. CH. CT. R. 96(d)(2).
32
Id. 97(c).
33
Id. 97(d). At the preliminary hearing, the parties and the arbitrator discuss the claims of the
dispute, the remedies sought, the defenses asserted, the legal authorities to be relied on, the scope of
discovery, the evidence to be presented at the arbitration hearing, and “the possibility of mediation or
other non-adjudicative methods of dispute resolution.” Id. 96(d)(4).
34
Id. 97(e).
35
Id. 98(a).
36
Id. 96(c).
37
Id.
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38

in the same way that a court award would be. The arbitrator may issue a final
award after the hearing, granting “any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems
just and equitable and within the scope of any applicable agreement of the
39
40
parties.” While it is not made public, a final judgment or decree is entered in
41
accordance with the award, and is enforced as any other judgment. The award
may be appealed, but only on the limited grounds available under the Federal
42
43
Arbitration Act. At this point, a record of the proceedings may be made public.
Following disclosure by Advanced Analogic Technologies, Inc. that it had
initiated an arbitration proceeding in the Court of Chancery, DelCOG filed its
44
complaint against the Delaware Court of Chancery judges. Both parties moved
45
for judgment on the pleadings.
B. Analysis
In her opinion, Judge McLaughlin, a Pennsylvania judge sitting by
designation in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
assessed whether Chancery arbitration offended the First Amendment right of
access. Following a statement of facts and procedural history, Judge McLaughlin
established that before the court could consider the experience and logic test, it had
to address a threshold question: whether Delaware implemented a form of
commercial arbitration sufficiently distinguishable from a trial that the court must
apply the experience and logic test, or whether it created a procedure sufficiently
similar to a trial, such that the court must apply the precedent established Publicker
46
Industries. By comparing the tenets of arbitration with those of civil litigation,
the court reached the conclusion that the procedure was comparable to civil
38
See id. 98(f)(2). While the holding in Delaware Coalition for Open Government suggests that
these orders “bind the parties much as any court orders would,” Del. Coal. For Open Gov’t v. Strine,
894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012), a reading of the Rules indicates otherwise. Compare DEL.
CH. CT. R. 98(f)(2) (“In addition to a final award, the Arbitrator may make other decisions, including
interim, interlocutory, or partial rulings, orders, and awards.”), with DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(3) (“Upon
the granting of a final award, a final judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be
enforced as any other judgment or decree.”). If all awards under Rule 98(f) were intended to be
enforced as any other judgment, the clause would not have only appeared in subsection (3). This is
consistent with section 349(c) of the Delaware Code, which provides that either party may apply to the
Supreme Court of Delaware to “enforce an order of the Court of Chancery,” which would be an
irrelevant provision if all orders were already enforceable by state power. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
349(c) (2009) (emphasis added).
39
DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(1) (emphasis added).
40
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b) (“Arbitration proceedings shall be considered confidential and
not of public record until such time, if any, as the proceedings are the subject of an appeal.”).
41
DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(3).
42
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c). An arbitration judgment can only be vacated if there is a
showing of fraud, corruption, undue means in procuring the award, partiality, corruption, certain
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, or the arbitrator exceeded his powers or failed to make a final
award. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). An arbitration award cannot be vacated on the showing of legal error. Id.
43
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b).
44
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012); Defendants’
Opening Brief in Support of their Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings at 9, Del. Coal. for Open
Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 11–01015), 2011 WL 6401166 [hereinafter Defendants’ Opening
Brief].
45
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
46
Id. at 500.
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litigation and, as such, it was “not necessary to reiterate the thorough analysis of
the experience and logic test performed by the Court of Appeals in Publicker
47
Industries.” Rather, the court concluded that the right of access applies to the
48
Delaware proceeding.
i. Chancery Arbitration is Analogous to Civil Litigation
The court first turned to the threshold question of whether Chancery
arbitration is sufficiently distinguishable from civil litigation, such that the court
49
would be required to apply the experience and logic test. Upon a comparison of
arbitration and litigation, the court found that the Delaware proceeding, while
50
labeled arbitration, is essentially a civil trial. The court proffered four primary
51
arguments for this conclusion.
First, the court found that the Delaware proceeding is analogous to a civil
trial because the Chancellor, and not the parties, has the duty to designate the
52
As such, the court found that the
specific judge to arbitrate the dispute.
proceeding is readily distinguishable from arbitration, given that the “essence of
arbitration” is that the parties voluntarily agree “to resolve their dispute through a
53
decision maker of their choosing.”
Second, the court concluded that the Delaware proceeding is similar to
litigation because “many of the same rules governing discovery in the Chancery
54
Court apply to the arbitration.”
The court noted that because parties to an
arbitration may craft their own procedures, while parties to civil litigation must
“follow[] the court’s procedures and guidelines,” the Delaware proceedings are
55
distinguishable from arbitration and similar to civil litigation.
Third, the court posited that the Delaware proceeding modeled a civil trial
56
because a sitting judge, in his duties as a public officer, presides over the
47

Id. at 504.
Id.
49
Id. at 500.
50
Id. at 502.
51
Id. at 502–03.
52
Id. at 502.
53
Id. at 500 (quoting Dluhos v. Strasber, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003)). It is recognized,
however, that if the parties to the dispute agree to have a third party designate the arbitrators, the parties
are still choosing their arbitrator. Davis v. Forshee, 34 Ala. 107, 109 (1859), disapproved of on other
grounds, Vines v. Crescent Transit, Inc., 267 Ala. 232, 234 (1958).
The fact that in this case the arbitrators were named and chosen by the clerk of
the court, cannot alter the principle. This power was expressly conferred on him
by the terms of the submission; he acted as the agreed agent of both of the
parties; and we must presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the
persons selected were satisfactory to the parties litigant. The maxim applies, qui
facit per alium, facit per se.
Davis, 34 Ala. at 109.
54
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
55
Id. at 500. Conversely, arbitrations are characterized by the parties’ ability to “craft arbitrations
to their specific needs,” and “design the applicable procedural rules.” Id. (citing Murray S. Levin, The
Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105,
106 (1997)).
56
Id. at 501. Specifically, the sitting judge “conducts the proceedings in the Chancery courthouse,
with the assistance of Chancery Court staff,” and is not compensated privately. Id. at 503.
48
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arbitration. The court observed that “[e]ven with the proliferation of alternative
dispute resolution in courts, judges in this county do not take on the role of
57
arbitrators,” and further indicated that “the judge’s public role and obligations
58
prevent a sitting judge from acting as an arbitrator for even consenting parties.”
The court distinguished the Delaware proceeding from court-annexed arbitrations
59
because in such arbitrations, third parties, often lawyers, sit as arbitrators. While
the court admitted that magistrate judges are permitted by statute to oversee court60
annexed arbitrations, it also noted that there are no records of such an instance.
Noting that “[a] judge bears a special responsibility to serve the public interest,”
and that that obligation in addition to the public role of that job, “is undermined
when a judge acts as an arbitrator bound only by the parties’ agreement,” the court
concluded that a sitting judge is fundamentally different than an arbitrator. As
61
such, the court found that the Delaware proceeding mirrors litigation.
Fourth, the court determined that because the judge’s final arbitration award
results in an enforceable judgment, the Delaware proceeding is dissimilar to
arbitration, where parties cannot enforce compliance except by pursuing
62
enforcement through a court.
Determining that the Delaware proceeding is a civil judicial proceeding,
rather than an arbitration, the court did not find it necessary to reiterate the analysis
of the experience and logic test performed by the Court of Appeals in Publicker
63
64
Industries. Rather, it concluded that the public benefits of openness were not
outweighed by the speculation that parties would arbitrate their disputes in other
65
available private fora.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the First
Amendment right of access applies to the Delaware proceeding and that the
66
portions of law that make the proceeding confidential violate that right.
IV. CRITIQUE
While the court addressed several similarities between Chancery arbitration
and civil litigation, it did not address the fundamental differences.67 First,
Chancery arbitration is fundamentally different than civil litigation because it
68
requires consent. Unlike litigation, in which a plaintiff may bring a suit against
57
Id. at 502 (citing ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 29–34 (1996)).
58
Id. (citing Elliott & Ten Eyck P’ship. v. Long Beach, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997);
Heenan v. Sobati, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Ct. App. 2002)).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 503.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 503–04.
64
Id. at 504. Such benefits include public education about important legal and social issues, public
scrutiny that discourages perjury and promotes confidence in the integrity of the courts, and public
confidence that court proceedings are fair. Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See generally id.
68
See DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(3) (providing that the arbitration process is commenced by a petition,
which “must also contain a statement that all parties have consented to arbitration by agreement or
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an unwilling defendant and may have judgment entered in his favor by default if
the defendant fails to appear, both parties to Chancery arbitration must consent to
69
the procedure at the time of filing.
Accordingly, in Chancery arbitration, no
party may be compelled to attend against its wishes, nor may either be subject to a
70
judgment without a fair opportunity to be heard.
Because jurisdiction for
Chancery arbitration does not extend to non-consenting parties, the legal rights and
71
obligations of those parties cannot be affected in the same way as in litigation.
This distinction so substantially limits the power and jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery that it would be improper to characterize Chancery arbitration as a “non72
jury trial.”
Second, as a natural extension of consent, Chancery arbitration is
fundamentally different than civil litigation because the authority of the decision
73
maker is derived from a private agreement and not from the public.
Consequently, while a judge overseeing a civil trial is limited by precedent, a judge
74
to Chancery arbitration is limited by the scope of the parties’ agreement. The
court deciding Delaware Coalition for Open Government contends that “[t]he
parties’ consent cannot alter the judge’s obligation in his public role as a judicial
75
officer.”
At its heart, this argument addresses a public policy concern that a
sitting judge, acting in his capacity as a judicial officer, may issue a private ruling
76
that, in effect, limits his accountability to the public. There is, however, nothing
revolutionary about a sitting judge serving as an arbitrator. Historically, sitting
stipulation . . . .”).
69
Id.
In court, a failure to appear or file a written response to pleadings can result in a
default judgment. The concept of a default judgment is not recognized in
arbitration. In arbitration, if the respondent does not appear, the claimant must
still sustain its burden of proof and submit evidence sufficient to sustain the
award.
John Arrastia, Jr. & Christi L. Underwood, Arbitration v. Litigation: You Control The Process v. The
Process Controls You, 64 DISP. RESOL. J. 31, 34 (2009–2010).
70
DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(a) (“At least one representative of each party with an interest in the issue or
issues to be arbitrated and with authority to resolve the matter must participate in the arbitration
hearing.”) (emphasis added).
71
Compare DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(3) (providing that the arbitration process is commenced by a
petition, which “must [] contain a statement that all parties have consented to arbitration by agreement
or stipulation. . . .”), and DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(a) (“At least one representative of each party with an
interest in the issue or issues to be arbitrated and with authority to resolve the matter must participate in
the arbitration hearing.”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, . . . the clerk must enter the party’s
default.”), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (“[T]he clerk . . . must enter judgment . . . against a defendant
who has been defaulted for not appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person.”).
72
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012); See FED. R. CIV.
P. 55(b)(1) (The clerk “must enter judgment . . . against a defendant who has been defaulted for not
appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person.”); Phoceene Sous-Marin, S.A. v. U.S.
Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1982) (“It is firmly established that the courts have
inherent power to . . . enter a default judgment to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
integrity of their orders.”); Arrastia & Underwood, supra note 69.
73
Steele, supra note 1, at 379.
74
See DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(1) (“The Arbitrator may grant any remedy . . . within the scope of any
applicable agreement of the parties.”); Arrastia & Underwood, supra note 68.
75
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
76
See id. at 503 (“The public does not know the factual findings the judge has made or what legal
rules the judge is, or should be, applying to these arbitrations.”).
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judges have rendered binding decisions outside of open court by party
77
Further, “[t]he American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial
agreement.
78
Conduct allows arbitration by judges as part of their official duties.” Finally, the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 permits sitting magistrate judges to
serve as arbitrators in court-sponsored arbitrations, which may result in binding
79
judgments. This notion that a judge may serve as an arbitrator is consistent with
the fact that many judicial activities aimed at resolving the dispute prior to
80
litigation are conducted outside of the public’s purview. Given that it is not in
violation of public policy for a sitting judge to serve as an arbitrator, the court
deciding Delaware Coalition for Open Government was wrong to rely so heavily
on the proposition that a sitting judge, by public interest, must necessarily act
differently than an arbitrator. Because the judges in Chancery arbitration do serve
the function of arbitrators, as they are limited in their decision by the scope of the
parties’ agreement, Chancery arbitration cannot be likened to civil litigation.
Third, Chancery arbitration is fundamentally different than civil litigation
81
because the rules may be modified by the participants. While Chancery Court
Rules 26–37 apply to the arbitration by default, prior to the hearing, the parties and
arbitrator together can agree to modify and adopt additional rules for the
82
arbitration. Because Chancery Court Rule 45 does not govern the arbitration, the
parties are required to create their own rules for discovery matters such as the
83
procedure for issuing subpoenas. This flexibility and choice is often recognized
77
JOHN T. MORSE, JR., THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND AWARD 105–06 (1872). Historically, it
was common for parties to stipulate that a trial be held before the judge at chambers, functioning much
like a settlement conference in which the judge would evaluate the merits of the case. See Beach v.
Beckwith, 13 Wis. 21, 21 (1860) (holding that “[w]here the parties to an action . . . stipulate that it may
be tried before the judge at chambers, and the finding be filed and judgment entered with the same
effect as though the trial were had before the court without a jury, a judgment entered in pursuance of
such stipulation must be regarded as though actually entered upon a trial before the court”). In addition,
at one point, American judges were permitted to be compensated for privately refereeing cases that
were scheduled on their dockets. See Dinsmore v. Smith, 17 Wis. 20, 23–24 (1863) (upholding an
award granted by a judge serving as a paid referee to a dispute that appeared on his docket on the
grounds that it was analogous to having a case tried before the judge at chambers), overruled in part by
Hills v. Passage, 21 Wis. 294, 295–97. While Dinsmore was overruled, it was overruled on the grounds
that a judge serving as a referee cannot enter a judgment against a party unless the agreement expressly
provides for it. Hills, 21 Wis. at 296. The court in Hills further provided that a judge serving as a
private referee is primarily problematic only if he is compensated for the services:
We know of no law authorizing a judge, even by consent of parties, to refer a
cause to himself as referee, with a stipulation for and followed by an actual
payment of fees to him under color of services as referee. We think such practice
is against the policy of the law. If the services are to be regarded as rendered by
him as a judge at chambers, as intimated in Dinsmore v. Smith, the constitution
prohibits his receiving fees for such services.
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
78
Steele, supra note 1, at 378.
79
28 U.S.C. § 653(a), (b) (2012).
80
Steele, supra note 1, at 380. For example, there is no public right of access to judicial mediations
or settlement conferences. Id.
81
See Tom Hals, Ruling Bars Private Arbitrations in Delaware Chancery Court: Del. Coalition for
Open Government v. Honorable Leo Strine, 27 No. 5 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. 9, at *2 (2012)
(“Attorneys . . . praised [Chancery arbitration] for the . . . ability of the parties to craft their own
procedures.”).
82
DEL. CH. CT. R. 96(c).
83
See id. 96(d)(4).
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as the most axiomatic difference between arbitration and litigation.
Because
Chancery arbitration contains the flexibility of private arbitration, it cannot
properly be analogized to litigation.
Fourth, Chancery arbitration is fundamentally different than civil litigation
because an award granted in the arbitration is readily distinguishable from a
85
judgment granted in litigation. Unlike the interim and partial awards granted by
judges in civil trials, such awards granted in Chancery arbitration are not
86
enforceable by state power. As such, a party seeking to enforce the award must
87
petition the Supreme Court of Delaware. While final awards are binding by state
power, they vary from judgments awarded in litigation in a more fundamental way.
Unlike trial court judgments, arbitration awards and orders may only be appealed
88
on the grounds recognized under the Federal Arbitration Act. This precludes an
89
appeal on the merits. As such, an award granted in Chancery arbitration is much
90
more ironclad than a trial court judgment.
This difference prevents Chancery
arbitration from being characterized as a private civil trial.
DelCOG asserts that these are “minor differences in procedure [and] are not
a relevant consideration[s].” It is well recognized, however, that the most
axiomatic difference between arbitration and litigation is flexibility and choice,
91
which is applied to nearly all aspects of Chancery arbitration. The fact that a
sitting judge serves as an arbitrator is not a sufficient distinction to cause Chancery
92
arbitration to mirror anything other than arbitration. Accordingly, the court had a
duty to apply the experience and logic test.

84

See Arrastia, supra note 69, at 32 (“The core concept of arbitration is flexibility.”); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) (“The most
important difference between arbitration and litigation—and the fundamental value of arbitration—is
the ability of users to tailor processes to serve particular needs.”).
85
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c).
86
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
87
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
88
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c).
89
See 9 U.S.C. § 9, 10(a) (2012). An award may only be appealed on the following grounds:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).
90
Kathleen M. Scanlon, Guidance on Arbitration Awards: ‘Finality vs. Reviewability’, 19
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 1 (2001) (“The almost ironclad finality of an arbitration award
has been a hallmark of arbitration.”). This feature has long been considered a chief advantage over
litigation, as it promotes faster resolution and cost savings. Id.
91
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
92
See 28 U.S.C. § 653(b) (2012). Court-annexed arbitration is still arbitration, even if a magistrate
judge serves as the arbitrator. See id.; Morse, supra note 75, at 105–06 (“If no proceedings are pending
or contemplated in court, there is of course no objection to selecting a judge to act as an arbitrator . . . .
[and] [o]n the contrary, it is very common so to do. . . .”).
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A. The Delaware Coalition for Open Government Did Not Satisfy the
Experience Test
Given that Chancery arbitration is not analogous to litigation, the court
should have analyzed whether arbitration has historically been open to the public.
For the purposes of satisfying the experience test, a strong historical precedent for
93
openly conducting the type of proceeding at issue must be present.
Unlike criminal or civil trials, arbitrations have historically been closed to
the public.94 “In English law . . . it has for centuries been recognized that
95
arbitrations take place in private.” Not only does the first American treatise on
96
arbitration support this proposition, but the court deciding Delaware Coalition
for Open Government, itself, admits that “[a]s the product of private agreement
between the parties, historically, arbitrations have been conducted outside the
97
public view.”
The prevalence of privacy in arbitration is more recently recognized by the
adoption of court sponsored arbitration systems, mediation programs, and early
98
neutral evaluation programs in the 1970s.
By 1998, one-quarter of federal
district courts and one-half of state courts had either mandatory or voluntary
99
arbitration programs as part of their judicial process. In 1998, Congress passed
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, which requires each United States district
court to “devise and implement its own alternative dispute resolution program, by
local rule . . . to encourage and promote the use of alternative dispute resolution in
100
its district,”
and to “provide litigants in all civil cases with at least one
101
alternative dispute resolution process.”
Even if the chosen alternative dispute
102
resolution program is arbitration, the court must “provide for . . . confidentiality
. . . and . . . prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution
103
communications.”
Because there is a clear history of arbitration being closed to the public, the
experience test is satisfied.

93

N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213 (3d Cir. 2002).
Michael Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 121, 122
(1995) (citing Sir Michael J. Mustill & Stewart C. Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial
Arbitration in England 432–34 (2d ed. 1989)).
95
Id.
96
See MORSE, supra note 75, at 116.
97
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 501 (D. Del. 2012).
98
Katherine V.W. Stone, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in 1 THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 131 (Stanley N. Katz ed. 2009).
99
Id.
100
28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012).
101
Id. § 652(a).
102
Courts may not require participation in arbitration without the parties’ consent. Id. Courts may
not arbitrate constitutional cases, civil rights cases, and cases in which damages of more than $150,000.
Id. § 654(a). A party to an arbitration may request a trial de novo for any reason. Id. § 657(c)(1). If
neither party requests a trial within thirty days of the arbitration, however, the arbitration is binding as a
court judgment and is not appealable on the merits. Id. § 657(a), (c)(1).
103
28 U.S.C. § 652(d). See, e.g., NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 7, 93–94 (“Confidentiality is generally
considered a bedrock principle for most ADR procedures. Thus, participants in court-based ADR are
usually assured at the outset of the process that their communications will be kept confidential.”).
94
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B. The Delaware Coalition for Open Government Did Not Satisfy the Logic
Test
Even if DelCOG could succeed in establishing the experience test, it would
not be able to establish the logic test. The logic test provides that public access
must play a “significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
104
question” in order for a constitutional challenge to be sustained.
Any inquiry
into whether a role is positive must also include an inquiry into whether that role is
105
potentially harmful.
In the instant case, not only does public right of access to
Chancery arbitration fail to actually provide access to the arbitrations in question,
it also harms Delaware’s ability to employ a creative dispute resolution process, in
effect, harming both potential users and the state itself.
First, pursuant to the logic test, one must look to whether right of access to a
106
particular procedure plays a significant positive role in its functioning.
The
purported benefits of openness generally include honesty from witnesses, reasoned
decision making from the fact finders, public education about the judicial system,
public awareness of social and legal issues, and public confidence in the
107
judiciary.
In some instances, however, public scrutiny can undermine the very
function of the procedure itself, particularly when the purpose of the procedure “is
108
to further an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.”
Chancery arbitration
must necessarily occur in private so that parties are free and encouraged to engage
109
in non-adjudicative dispute resolution, which often requires parties to disclose
potentially damaging information that, if not for privacy, would otherwise be
110
withheld.
In addition, right of access undermines the cornerstone of Chancery
111
arbitration: privacy.
An enforceable right of access to Chancery arbitration
would therefore alter the way the process is conducted by impeding the Chancery
112
Court’s ability to resolve the dispute.
Because the function of Chancery
arbitration is undermined by public access, parties who would otherwise engage in
113
Chancery arbitration will instead choose a private, alternative arbitral forum.
Accordingly, the dispute will nevertheless be kept from the public’s purview and,
as such, the benefits of right of access to Chancery arbitration will never
materialize. Therefore, it cannot be said that right of access plays a substantial role
104
N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Press-Enter.
v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. at 8).
105
See id. at 217 (“[W]ere the logic prong only to determine whether openness serves some good, it
is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the public would not have a First
Amendment right of access.”).
106
Id. at 206.
107
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 504 (D. Del. 2012).
108
B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that pubic scrutiny in in-chambers
conferences undermined its very function).
109
See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (“In addition [Chancery arbitration]
encourages settlement and non-adversarial resolution at nearly every stage.”); see also DEL. CH. CT. R.
98(a) (requiring both parties have a representative with decision-making power to be present); DEL. CH.
CT. R. 97(d) (requiring parties to discuss the “possibility of mediation or other non-adjudicative
methods of dispute resolution.”).
110
Steele, supra note 1, at 378.
111
Id. at 380.
112
See id. at 378 (“Confidentiality is essential to getting the dispute resolved.”).
113
Id.
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in the functioning of Chancery arbitration.
Secondly, to fully analyze the experience prong, the harmful ramifications of
114
Among the potentially harmful
the public’s right of access must be assessed.
ramifications of public openness that courts have considered is whether “[f]orcing .
. . proceedings into an older criminal procedure mold would have a stifling effect
115
on a state’s ability to use creative methods in solving its problems.”
Here,
Delaware enacted its arbitration statute to “remain at the cutting-edge in dispute
116
resolution” by providing a cost-effective and highly efficient program,
and to
offer a creative solution to the concern that local judgments are not enforced
117
internationally.
By requiring that Chancery arbitration be public, thereby
effectively abrogating use of the proceeding, Delaware entities will be
disadvantaged because they will not have access to a private, efficient, and
118
predictable arbitration in a nationally renowned forum, and Delaware, itself, will
be disadvantaged because it will be greatly hindered in attracting international
119
corporations.
V. IMPACT
The court’s holding in Delaware Coalition for Open Government, ordering
Chancery arbitration to be public, eliminates a substantial opportunity for
Delaware entities to resolve their disputes in a confidential, predictable, and cost120
efficient manner.
Ultimately, while business entities resolve their disputes in
different fora depending upon each dispute’s individual factual scenarios, business
entities undeniably want access to a competent, expeditious resolution, with
121
confidence and predictability of outcome from the chosen process.
Chancery
arbitration provided a forum in which parties could tailor the process to fit their
individual needs and confidentiality concerns, while still providing confidence and
122
predictability to clients unfamiliar and weary of private arbitration.
With the
order that the arbitration proceeding be open to the public, Delaware entities are
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N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 206, 200–02 (3d Cir. 2002).
First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 473 (3d Cir. 1986).
116
H.R. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009).
117
Defendants’ Opening Brief, supra note 44, at 17 (quoting Daniel E. Gonzalez, The Value of
Arbitration, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, LEADING LAWYERS ON THE ART & SCIENCE OF
ARBITRATION MEDIATION, & MORE 49–50 (2004) (“The biggest advantage of arbitration overall is the
ability to enforce it around the world.”).
118
Steele, supra note 1, at 378.
119
Id. at 377 (discussing that the General Assembly enacted the citizenship restriction on Chancery
arbitration because it believed that only those paying dues to be a Delaware citizen should be entitled to
participate in and benefit from the program).
120
See Distinguished Visiting Practitioner James Griffin, Address at the Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship, and & Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds
for Large Business Disputes and How it Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6. J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 382–83 (describing a transaction where a European entity was not
comfortable with the American legal system and the potential damages, but was comfortable in having
a proceeding brought in Delaware by use of the arbitration proceeding).
121
Steele, supra note 1, at 377.
122
Griffin, supra note 114, at 386–87 (discussing that clients involved in a negotiation of a major
acquisition, while comfortable with the Court of Chancery, are uncomfortable with the concept of
arbitration).
115
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forced to forego an innovative dispute resolution mechanism.
The court’s holding, additionally, eliminates an opportunity for Delaware,
itself, to gain a competitive edge in the field of international dispute resolution,
which is developing rapidly in jurisdictions outside of the United States and,
123
accordingly, attracting international corporations offshore.
Currently, at least
three jurisdictions—Australia, India, and Ireland—have established specialized
124
courts to handle international arbitration matters.
Other jurisdictions have
developed courts or judges to hear cases to challenge or enforce arbitration
125
awards.
In addition, France and many other nations have enacted new
126
arbitration laws “to enhance their attractiveness as seats of arbitration.”
The
above nations have adopted these changes in recognition that arbitration is
important to their economies and to their positions in the world of global
127
commerce.
Because Delaware is unable to maintain its private Chancery
arbitration program, Delaware must forgo an opportunity to gain a significant share
in the international dispute resolution market, possibly altering its position in the
128
world of global commerce.

VI. CONCLUSION
The district court should have found that the Delaware Arbitration program
is constitutional. The Delaware proceedings are different from constitutionally
protected court proceedings because they do not involve civil or criminal litigation,
but rather arbitration. Arbitration has not historically been open to the public and,
therefore, the Delaware proceedings should likewise be private. As a consequence
of this decision, Delaware entities have lost an opportunity to resolve their disputes
in a private and predictable forum and Delaware, as a state, has lost an opportunity
to gain a competitive edge in international dispute resolution.
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Defendants’ Opening Brief, supra note 44, at 17; see also Monica Shilling, Address at the
Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, and the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration:
What the Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30,
2012), in 6. J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 385 (“[T]here’s a perception . . . of the American
litigation system [a]s being not cost-effective, unpredictable, [and] that it takes a really long time, which
is why you find London as one of the centers of dispute resolution.”).
124
Defendants’ Opening Brief, supra note 44, at 17.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.

